

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 BRUSSE 00538 282130Z

66

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

USIA-15 NEA-11 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 AEC-11 OMB-01 IO-14

OIC-04 DRC-01 /165 W

----- 113867

R 281629Z JAN 74

FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9732

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

S E C R E T BRUSSELS 0538

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO, BE

SUBJECT: BELGIAN VIEWS ON MBFR

1. SUMMARY. BELGIAN MBFR REPRESENTATIVE ADRIAENSSEN DISCUSSED WITH US ON JANUARY 25 HIS VIEWS ON THE EMISSARY SYSTEM, PROSPECTS FOR PHASE I NEGOTIATIONS, AND WESTERN EUROPEAN DISIDERATA FOR ENTERING PHASE II. HIS COMMENTS ON SOVIET DIVISIVE TACTICS IN VIENNA REPORTED SEPTTEL. END SUMMARY.

2. WHEN EMBOFF ASKED ABOUT CONTINUING BELGIAN RESISTANCE TO ALLOWING EMISSARIES TOO MUCH SCOPE IN VIENNA, ADRIAESSEN ADMITTED THAT IT IS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT MUCH PROGRESS IN PLENARY SESSIONS OR IN OPEN-ENDED WORKING GROUPS. FRANKLY, HE SAID, OPPOSITION TO THE EMISSARY SYSTEM IS INCONSISTENT WITH WESTERN EUROPEAN

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 BRUSSE 00538 282130Z

AGREEMENT TO THE ALLIED POSITION FOR PHASE I: HAVING

AGREED THAT PHASE I SHOULD DEAL EXCLUSIVELY WITH US AND SOVIET FORCES, THE WESTERN EUROPEANS MUST GIVE THE US DELEGATION CONSIDERABLE LEEWAY IN ITS EFFORTS TO SEEK SOME COMMON GROUND WITH THE RUSSIANS. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT PLENARIES AND OPEN-ENDED WORKING GROUPS MUST BE RETAINED AS NEGOTIATING INSTRUMENTS, THE FIRST FOR PUBLIC CONSUMPTION AND THE LATTER TO PRESERVE THE SENSE OF FULL ALLIED AND EASTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION.

3. ADRIAENSSEN JUDGES THAT THE SOVIETS ARE SERIOUS ABOUT MBFR AND ANXIOUS TO MAINTAIN A STEADY NEGOTIATING PACE, BOTH TO AVOID GIVING THE WEST A PRETEXT FOR DELAYING PROGRESS IN CSCE AND TO STRIKE A BARGAIN BEFORE HARD-LINERS IN THE KREMLIN GATHER ENOUGH FORCE TO IMPEDE BREZHNEV'S DETENTE STRATEGY. NEVERTHELESS, HE DOES NOT BELIEVE THE RUSSIANS WILL ACCEPT THE ALLIED PHASE I GROUND FORCE PROPOSAL UNTIL THE WEST OFFERS TO INCLUDE OTHER FORCE ELEMENTS AS A BALANCE TO SOVIET TANKS. REALIZING THAT THE INCLUSION OF AIRCRAFT WOULD ENTAIL A GOOD YEAR'S ADDITIONAL STUDY AND A CONSEQUENT DELAY IN REACHING AGREEMENT, ADRIAENSSEN SAID, THE RUSSIANS WILL PROBABLY NOT PRESS IN THAT DIRECTION. INSTEAD, THE EVENTUAL WESTERN COMPROMISE WILL HAVE TO INVOLVE TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS (HE MENTIONED PERSHING MISSILES SPECIFICALLY). IN ADRIAENSSEN'S OPINION, THE WEST COULD WELL AFFORD TO OFFER A REDUCTION IN SUCH WEAPONS WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING THE ALLIED DEFENSE POSTURE.

4. WITH RESPECT TO WESTERN EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARD PHASE II REDUCTIONS, ADRIAENSSEN SAID THAT MUCH WOULD DEPEND UPON THE AMOUNT OF TIME TO ELAPSE BETWEEN PHASE I AND PHASE II, I.E., THE TIME ALLOWED THE EUROPEANS ALLIES TO CONSIDER THEIR FUTURE DEFENSE COURSE IN LIGHT OF THE AGREEMENT REACHED IN PHASE I. ACCORDING TO ADRIAENSSEN, WESTERN EUROPEAN WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN PHASE II REDUCTIONS WOULD BE ENHANCED BY THREE CONDITIONS: SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THE ALLIED COMMON CEILING CONCEPT IN A PHASE I AGREEMENT; THE UNDERSTANDING THAT WESTERN EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS WILL
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 BRUSSE 00538 282130Z

BE COLLECTIVE RATHER THAN NATIONAL; AND THE UNDERSTANDING THAT SUCH REDUCTIONS WILL NOT ENTAIL DEMOBILIZATION OR DISARMAMENT. BY WAY OF ILLUSTRATING THE LAST POINT, ADRIAENSSEN SPOKE OF LEAVING OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF RELOCATING ALLIED AIRCRAFT NOW IN CENTRAL EUROPE (SHOULD THEY FIGURE IN PHASE II) AT BASES IN THE UK OR FRANCE (SIC).

5. COMMENT: AS USUAL, ADRIAENSSEN APPEARED TO BE
SPEAKING SOMEWHAT CASUALLY, AND HIS REFERENCES TO
"WESTERN EUROPEAN" VIEWS ARE AT BEST PRESUMPTUOUS. WE
MUST ASSUME, HOWEVER, THAT HE DOES EXPRESS OFFICIAL
BELGIAN OPINION. STRAUZ-HUPE

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MBFR, DISARMAMENT, NEGOTIATIONS, TROOP REDUCTIONS, BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 28 JAN 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: garlanwa
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974BRUSSE00538
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: n/a
From: BRUSSELS
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740113/aaaaalfv.tel
Line Count: 120
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: garlanwa
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 20 MAR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <20 MAR 2002 by worrelsw>; APPROVED <12 APR 2002 by garlanwa>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: BELGIAN VIEWS ON MBFR
TAGS: PARM, BE, US, NATO, CSCE
To: STATE ECDEF WASHDC
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005